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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON HARRIS and 
PE.AHL A. HARRIS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
EULA TILLEY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12619 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STA TEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs brought action against defendant in 
District Court, Case No. 188517, to recover amounts 
expended for repairs made to defendant's property and 
management fees incurred during defendant's absence 
from the State of Utah, during which time plaintiffs 
managed and maintained the property which is the 
subject of this appeal. To obtain the money for the 
repairs, the plaintiffs co-signed with defendant on a 
1 
promissory note and defendant gave them a quit-claim 
deed to secure the note for plaintiffs. The trial court 
found the quit-claim deed to be a security and not a deed 
absolute. The court awarded the plaintiffs a money 
judgment and gave plaintiffs a mortgage against de-
fendant's property to secure the judgment. 
Plaintiffs then sued in District Court, Case No. 
192613 to foreclose on the above mortgage. They were 
awarded a Decree of Foreclosure, and the property was 
sold to the plaintiffs at Sheriff's sale. Defendant duly 
filed her claim for a homestead exemption and moved 
the court to determine that the plaintiffs' foreclosure 
was subject to her homestead exemption. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY 
LOWER COURT 
The lower court rendered its conclusions of law 
and judgment on July 27, 1971, determining that the 
quit-claim deed given by the defendant was not an 
equitable mortgage within the scope of Sections 28-1-1 
and 78-23-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that 
defendant's giving of said quit-claim deed did not con-
stitute a waiver and relinquishment of her right to a 
homestead exemption incident to the foreclosure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to sustain the Order protecting 
the defendant's homestead interest from execution and 
sale. 
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STATEl\IE:\TT 0.F FACTS 
In July, 190.J., defendant, Eula Tilley, owned her 
home at HHi8 South 8th East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which was dear except for back taxes. ( R. 20, L3-4). 
On October 5, 1965, defendant quit-claimed her 
property to plaintiffs, Layton Harris and Pearl A. 
Harris. The quit-claim deed. was used as security by the 
plaintiffs for co-signing a loan from First Federal Sav-
ings an<l Loan Association, who then loaned plaintiffs 
$6,.500.00. The $6,500.00 was paid to the plaintiffs and 
used for making improvements to and for the remodel-
ing of defendant's home in their capacity as property 
managers of defendant's property, while defendant 
remained outside the State of Utah. Plaintiffs collected 
rent from defendant's property which was to be used for 
income, repairs and to retire the loan. (R. 19, Ll4 - R. 
20 L3; R. 37; L:W-22; R. 39 LS-9). All of the repairs 
to defendant's property were done by plaintiff, Mr. 
Harris, who is a licensed contractor, and his two sons. 
(R. 26, Lll-16). 
In May, 1!)67, plaintiffs, without notice to defend-
ant, recorded. the quit-claim deed and obtained a loan 
on defendant's property, payable to themselves, in the 
amount of $!J,OOO.OO. (R. 29, LIS - R. 30, L4). This 
second loan from First Federal Savings and Loan en-
tirely retired the balance due on the note for $6,500.00, 
and the balance was placed in plaintiffs' personal ac-
count. ( R. 55, L20-27). All of the monies loaned were 
paid to, received bv, and controlled by plaintiffs. 
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Upon defendant's return to Utah, she moyed into 
her property and shortly thereafter, plaintiffs sued de-
fendant, as a tenant of plaintiff's property, in eviction 
for unpaid rent, Case No. 188517, Third District Court 
Salt Lake County, Utah. ' 
At the trial in Case No. 188517, the court declared 
title to the property to be defendant's and gave plain-
tiffs a money judgment against defendant in the amount 
of $10,876.91, for their repair and remodeling costs 
incident to said property. The court also granted plain· 
tiffs a mortgage against defendant's property to secure 
the amount of the judgment. (R. 6). 
Plaintiffs then foreclosed on the said lien by filing 
a separate action, Case No. 192613, to foreclose the 
mortgage. The court awarded a decree of foreclosure 
and the property was sold at Sheriff's Sale to the plain-
tiff's. Defendant duly filed her declaration of homestead 
and moved the court to determine that the plaintiff's 
foreclosure was subject to her homestead exemption. 
(R. 1). 
The judge who heard District Court Case No. 
188517 was the same judge who heard the arguments 
and passed judgment granting defendant her homestead 
exemption in the combined cases Nos. 188517 and 
192613. (R. 4-8). 
In case No. 188517, in plaintiff's pleading, "Reply 
to Counterclaim,'' plaintiffs prayed for, " ... a judg· 
ment establishing an equitable lien in the plaintiffs 
... '', and against the defendant's property. The issue 
4 
was before the court and the court awarded plaintiffs 
a money judgment instead and granted the plain-
tiffs a mortgage against the property to secure the 
money judgment. Appeal was taken by defendant in 
Case No. 188517, but not on the issue of an equitable 
mortgage against the homestead. Plaintiffs made no 
appeal, nor did they pray for an equitable lien against 
the homestead in the relief sought in their Respondents' 
Brief in the said appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HOMESTEAD IS AN ABSOLUTE 
RIGHT THAT EXISTS BOTH IN THE HEAD 
OF FAMILY AND IN THE FAMILY; AND 
THE \VHOLE \VORLD IS PLACED ON NO-
TICE OF THIS RIGHT THROUGH THE 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 
XXII, §1 AND THE HEAD OF FAMILY ACTS 
AS A TRUSTEE :FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
THE RIGHTS OF THE OTHER MEMBER 
OR MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY. THUS, 
ALIENATION OF THE HOMESTEAD MUST 
BE VOLUNTARY, KNOWLEDGEABLE, CON-
SCIOUS, SPECIFIC AND EXPRESS. 
It is very clear from the facts that defendant owned 
the subject home free and clear except for a tax lien, 
prior to the granting of the first loan on October 5, 
1965. It is also very clear from the facts that the pur-
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pose and use of both loans was that of a contractor 
materialman, laborer, and/or mechanic in the repair~ 
and remodeling of defendant's home. 
The contractor in this case was the plaintiff, Mr. 
Harris, who was a licensed contractor and did contract 
for all of the repairs and remodeling to defendant's 
property, and hired his two sons to perform the work 
thereon. (R. 26, Lll-16). 
Plaintiffs' claim against defendant is for the repair 
costs, which repairs .Mr. Harris performed while manag-
ing the property for defendant. 
At best, plaintiffs have a mechanic's type lien 
against defendant's property, which does not defeat 
defendant's homestead exemption. 
The Homestead Exemption is created in Article 
XXII, §1, of the Utah State Constitution, and is an 
absolute right. Kimball v. Sal,isbury, 17 Utah 381, 53 
Pac. 1037, (1909), and Panogopulos v. lf'lanning, 93 
Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937). 
All laws relating to the absolute right of the home-
stead exemption, Kimbal,l v. Salisbury, Supra, must be 
liberally and broadly construed to protect the home-
stead and make it effective for its purpose. In re: 
Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 390, 73 P.2d 967, (1937); 
Folsom v. Aspen, 25 Utah 299, 71 Pac. 315 (1902); 
and Panogopulos v. Manning, Supra. 
The purpose and intent of the homestead was to 
protect the home for the family as against acts of the 
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family which would deprive the family of the exemption 
without any element of knowledge or consent on the 
part of the family. Volker-Scowcroft Lumber v. Vance, 
et al, 32 Utah 74, 88 Pac. 896, (1907). "Homestead 
rights are not founded upon equity. They are founded 
upon public policy for the protection of the home . . ." 
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, et al, Supra 
at 85. 
In the present case, we have the plaintiffs co-signing 
on a promissory note for $6,500.00. The purpose of the 
note was to repair and remodel the plaintiff's house 
(Appellants' Brief, Pg. 3), and the contractor who per-
formed those repairs and the remodeling was the plain-
tiff, Mr. Harris. ( R. 26, L 11-16) . Plaintiffs received a 
quit-claim from defendant to be used as security for 
the loan and not as a deed absolute or a mortgage which 
could have as easily been prepared. (R. 45-46.) 
Plaintiffs then used the quit-claim deed as a deed 
absolute, recorded it and obtained a second loan for 
$9,000.00, without the knowledge of the defendant. 
(R. 29, LIS - R. 30, L4). Plaintiff's relationship to 
defendant at this time was that of property managers, 
a fiduciary relationship, and that of contractor, for 
the repairs and remodeling of defendant's premises. 
Now the plaintiffs wish to invoke the court's equity 
to establish the quit-claim deed as an equitable mortgage 
that is an exception to the homestead exemption. 
In Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, et al, 
Supra, the court deals with the specific point in question 
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and states unequivocally that unless the homestead as 
such is consciously and specifically impaired by the 
owner in an express writing, the Constitution protects 
the homestead from any judgment, lien, execution or 
forced sale. 
While the Constitution has placed no inhibi-
tion to a voluntary alienation of a homestead it 
has specifically exempted it, without excepti~n 
from all involuntary or execution sales ... th~ 
Constitution has not prohibited a homestead 
claimant from selling or involuntarily incumber-
ing the homestead, and he may make any kind of 
voluntariy alienation of it, or incumber it ... 
Now, it may be said that the defendant, the home-
stead claimant, having herself voluntarily made 
and entered into the contract for the construction 
of the building on the homestead, and the ma-
terial having been furnished by plaintiff in pur-
suance of it, therefore, she voluntarily incum-
bered the homestead the same as though she had 
given a mortgage upon it. That would be true 
if by the terms of her contract she had pledged 
the homestead, or had given a lien on it [the 
homestead] as by law provided. But it is not made 
to appear that the contract contains any stipu-
lation giving contractors, materialmen, laborers, 
mechanics or any one a lien upon the homestead, 
and nothing oppears from which the c?ntract can 
be construed into a contract for a lzen. In the 
absence of an express contract creating it, the 
lien which a materinlman or mechanic may be-
come entitled to depends solely upon the statute 
for its existence. V olker-S cowcroft Lumber Co. 
v. Vance, Supra, (emphasis added). 
The court stated the title to the property remained 
vested in the defendant, and, without more, the judg· 
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ment claimed by plaintiffs is, at most, a mechanic's lien, 
a creature of statute, and homesteads are exempt from 
judgment and foreclosure of mechanic's liens. Stucki 
v.Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 201P.2d486, (1949), following 
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, Supra, and 
Utah Builders Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 257, 
42 P.2d 989, ( 1935). 
POINT II 
IN ORDER FOR AN EQUITABLE LIEN 
TO BE ESTABLISHED, OVERT ACTS ON 
THE PART OF THE PERSON CLAIMING A 
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION MUST BE IN 
EVIDENCE WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE PARTY CONSCIOUSLY INTENDED TO 
ENCUMBER THE HOMESTEAD IN THE 
WAY, MANNER AND TO THE EXTENT SO 
ENCUMBERED. 
The first loan that the parties were involved in was 
in the amount of $6,500.00. It was for this loan that the 
plaintiff signed a quit-claim deed. The first loan might 
have been construed to be an equitablet mortgage, but 
the second loan for $9,000.00 cannot. The second loan 
was solely that of the plaintiffs. The second loan was 
taken out by the plaintiffs without the knowledge or 
consent of the defendant. (R. 29, LIS - R. 30, L4). 
The second loan also completely retired and terminated 
the first loan. It also terminated any contract the parties 
may have had. The plaintiffs also waived any rights 
they may have had to an equitable mortgage by their 
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subsequent conduct, which eliminated the first loan and 
security agreement (quit-claim deed) , as between the 
plaintiffs and defendant, thereon. 
In equity the court looks to the intent of the parties. 
If the conduct of the parties is to be believed, the plain-
tiffs only received a mechanics lien, the same as any 
contractor for repairs made. 
How can an equitable mortgage, if there be one, in 
the form of a mechanic's lien, be stronger that a purchase 
money mortgage, which is protected by statute as an 
exception to the homestead exemption? 
"Purchase money" has been defined by case law 
to be money actually used in, and for the purchase of 
land. If the purchase money includes monies for other 
indebtedness, only that portion thereof traceable to the 
purchase money, stands ahead of the homestead exemp-
tion, and no other. McMurdie v. Chugg, 99 Utah 403, 
107 P.2d 163 (1940). 
The plaitniffs now on appeal ask that the court 
grant them a mortgage against the homestead in the 
amount of $10,876.91, because they received a quit-
claim deed to secure a mechanic's lien for $6,500.00. The 
plaintiffs wish this court to construe the quit-claim 
deed to be an express waiver of homestead contrary to 
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, et al., Supra, 
and they wish this court to extend an equitable mortgage 
to any and all indebtedness of defendant, contrary to 
this court's rules of construction in purchase money 
mortgages. McMurdie v. Chugg, Supra. 
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POINT III 
A JUDG.MENT RENDERED, WHICH HAD 
AS ISSUE, EITHER THROUGH THE PLEAD-
INGS AND/OR EVIDENCE, THE QUESTION 
OF THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AND 
WHERE THE ISSUE OF THE HOMESTEAD 
WAS NOT PURSUED BY THE MOVING 
PARTY, THE FIRST JUDGMENT IS RES 
JUDICATA AS TO THE ISSUE OF HOME-
STEAD, IN ALL SUBSEQUENT PROCEED-
INGS. 
In Bell v. Jones, 104 Utah 306, 139 P.2d 884, 
( 1943), the court states that an execution or order of 
sale may not go beyond the terms of the judgment upon 
which it is based. In Case No. 188517, plaintiffs' Reply 
to Defendant's Counterclaim prays for an equitable lien 
on the premises in favor of the plaintiffs. The court 
awarded a money judgment instead. The order was 
entered June 16, 1970. Plaintiffs made no appeal from 
the money judgment. The plaintiffs, in their pleadings, 
obviously claimed an equitable lien on the constitution-
ally protected homestead in an attempt to defeat the 
homestead exemption. They had the right and oppor-
tunity to appeal the court's decision to grant a money 
judgment. They failed to pursue their right of appeal 
and the matter is res judicata and a bar to them in any 
action to establish an equitable lien subsequently. 46 
Am J ur.2d, §382, et seq. 
If the homestead is in the pleadings and evidence, 
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and there is judgment without appeal, the judgment 
is res judicata on the question of homestead. 
"Either the judgment ... was a lien upon the land 
in controversy or it was not ... If the land constituted 
a homestead, there was no lien ... To hold that it was 
a lien without first determining the question as to 
whether it is such property as is subject to a lien by 
the plain provisions of the homestead statute, is to give 
a judgment creditor a right in addition to what is given 
him by the statute." Antelope Shearing Corral v. Con-
solidated Wagon and Machine Co., 54 Utah 355, 180 
Pac. 597 ( 1919). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that plaintiff's 
judgment mortgage was simply a mechanics-type lien, 
which by law cannot defeat a homestead. Defendant 
did not voluntarily relinquish or pledge her homestead 
rights, nor did the court determine that the judgment 
mortgage superseded the homestead based on pleadings 
and evidence. Therefore, defendant is entitled to her 
homestead exemption. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALE J. CRAFT 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
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